Employee incentives to make firm specific investment: Implications for resource-based theories of corporate diversification by WANG, Heli & Barney, Jay B.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
4-2006
Employee incentives to make firm specific
investment: Implications for resource-based
theories of corporate diversification
Heli WANG
Singapore Management University, hlwang@smu.edu.sg
Jay B. Barney
Ohio State University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2006.20208691
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, Human Resources Management
Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WANG, Heli and Barney, Jay B.. Employee incentives to make firm specific investment: Implications for resource-based theories of
corporate diversification. (2006). Academy of Management Review. 31, (2), 466-476. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3456
NOTE
EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES TO MAKE FIRM-
SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
RESOURCE-BASED THEORIES OF CORPORATE
DIVERSIFICATION
HELI C. WANG
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
JAY B. BARNEY
The Ohio State University
We argue that the risk associated with the value of a firm’s core resources has an
impact on employee decisions to make firm-specific investments, independent of the
threat of opportunism that might exist in a particular exchange. We further explore
mechanisms firms may adopt to mitigate the employee incentive problem stemming
from the risk associated with core resource value. These arguments shed new light on
resource-based theories of corporate diversification.
There is a paradox at the heart of current
resource-based theories of superior firm perfor-
mance. On the one hand, these theories recog-
nize that employee firm-specific investments
are among the most important sources of eco-
nomic rents for firms (Barney, 1991). Employee
firm-specific investments—including employee
knowledge of how a firm operates, knowledge
about a firm’s key suppliers and customers, and
knowledge about how to work effectively with
other employees—often meet the criteria estab-
lished in resource-based logic for generating
sustained competitive advantages (Barney,
1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). The rents generated
by these firm-specific investments are often
shared between a firm’s employees and its own-
ers (Becker, 1964; Hashimoto, 1981; Rumelt, 1987)
and, thus, can be a source of wealth for both the
employees and the owners.1
On the other hand, a great deal of research in
organizational economics suggests that employ-
ees who make firm-specific investments risk op-
portunistic actions by the firms in which they
invest (Williamson, 1985). Once employees make
firm-specific investments, firms can systemati-
cally extract wealth from these employees, and
employees have few ways they can protect
themselves. Indeed, the hazards associated with
making firm-specific investments are so signif-
icant that, absent some protection, current theo-
ries suggest that employees will avoid making
them altogether (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
In a great deal of research, scholars have doc-
umented ways that employees can protect them-
selves against the threat of opportunistic behav-
iors if they make firm-specific investments
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). In additional work re-
searchers have identified ways that firms can
credibly reassure employees that they will not
behave opportunistically in such settings (Cas-
tanias & Helfat, 1991; Grossman & Hart, 1986;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rajan & Zingales, 1998).
With these protections and reassurances in
place, current theory seems to suggest that em-
ployees will be willing to make firm-specific
investments.
However, beyond the threat of opportunism
that plagues specific investments made by em-
Discussions with Jaepil Choi, Yaping Gong, J. T. Li, Hong-
Seok Oh, Ann Tsui, and other seminar participants at HKUST
were instrumental in the development of an earlier draft of
this paper. We also thank former associate editor Anand
Swaminathan and three anonymous reviewers for their very
helpful comments in the reviewing process.
1 How much of the rents will be appropriated by the em-
ployees and how much will be appropriated by the firm’s
owners depend on the relative bargaining power of each
party (Coff, 1999).
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ployees, there is another risk accepted by em-
ployees that has received less attention in the
literature.2 This is the risk that the value of the
underlying assets controlled by a firm—the as-
sets that an employee makes investments spe-
cific to—will fall. If these assets drop in value,
then the value of the investments made by em-
ployees that are specific to these assets will
also drop. This will be the case even if none of
the parties in the exchange engage in opportu-
nistic behaviors. Employees may be very reluc-
tant to make firm-specific investments when the
future value of a firm’s underlying assets is very
risky, even if protections and reassurances are
in place that effectively eliminate any threat of
opportunism in the exchange.
In this paper we explore the implications for
both employees and firms of these risky assets.
For employees, we show that risky core firm
assets can reduce employee incentives to make
firm-specific investments, even when there is no
threat of opportunism in these exchanges. For
firms, we discuss some actions firms can take to
address concerns employees might have about
making specific investments in risky firm as-
sets. These actions include directly compensat-
ing employees for risk bearing and engaging in
resource-based product market diversification.
We then explore this latter mechanism in detail
and discuss the implications of this analysis for
the theory of diversification. We begin by devel-
oping a simple model of employee decisions
about whether or not to invest in firm-specific
human capital that depends both on the threat
of opportunism in this exchange and the riski-
ness of the value of a firm’s underlying assets.
A MODEL OF EMPLOYEE DECISIONS TO
MAKE FIRM-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS
Two kinds of resources are important in a
model of employee decisions to make firm-
specific investments: (1) the rare and costly to
imitate resources controlled by a firm that an
employee is contemplating making specific in-
vestments in and (2) the resources controlled by
an employee that will be modified if specific
investments are made. In this paper we call the
first kind of resource a “core firm resource” and
the second a “human capital resource.”
Of course, not all the resources controlled by a
firm are rare and costly to imitate—that is, not
all the resources controlled by a firm are core
firm resources, as defined here. Indeed, many
noncore firm resources—that is, many firm re-
sources that are not rare or costly to imitate—
may be necessary if a firm is to gain competitive
advantages and earn economic rents. However,
these common and imitable resources do not
separate firms having the potential to gain com-
petitive advantages from those not having this
potential. These firms are separated by the rare
and costly to imitate resources they do and do
not control.
It is also the case that the possession of rare
and costly to imitate resources, by itself, is usu-
ally insufficient for a firm to generate economic
rents. In addition, employees need to know how
to exploit these resources through the strategies
a firm pursues. As Porter argues, “Resources are
not valuable in and of themselves, but they are
valuable because they allow firms to perform
activities” (1991: 108).
Noncore firm resources are neither rare nor
costly to imitate and, thus, can be exploited by
nonspecific human capital investments made
by a firm’s employees. However, core firm re-
sources will generally require highly firm-
specific investments in human capital if they
are to be exploited in a firm’s strategies. That is,
employees must understand the nature of these
core resources, develop a working knowledge of
how they can be used in conceiving of and im-
plementing strategies, and how they can be pro-
tected and nurtured over time if these resources
are to be fully exploited in creating competitive
advantages and economic rents. These human
capital investments have little value in alterna-
tive settings but can create a great deal of value
in a particular firm.
2 Agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Holmstrom & Mil-
grom, 1987; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shavell, 1979) also
stresses the existence of a tradeoff between risk and incen-
tives, but with a specific interest in optimal contract design
and appropriate corporate governance mechanisms under
varying levels of outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, and
information. This paper differs in at least two aspects. First,
although the agency literature also concerns itself with the
effect of risk considerations on agent incentives, it does not
directly address the specific incentive problems associated
with employees making specific human capital investments.
Second, because of contract incompleteness, the optimal
contract design emphasized in the agency literature is
rarely the first-best solution (e.g., Shavell, 1979). Thus, it
almost always leaves room for firms to adopt strategic risk
management mechanisms, such as resource-based diversi-
fication strategies.
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Now, let us consider an employee, i, of a firm
choosing an optimal level of human capital in-
vestment specific to a firm’s core resource. The
amount (units) of specific investments made by
this employee is denoted as xi. Let us assume
further that the payoff the employee is expected
to appropriate from the total rent generated per
unit of her specific investment (in combination
with the core resource of the firm) is a fraction,
a(0  a  1), of the total expected amount of rent
generated per unit of her specific human capital
investment, ri; ri is, in turn, an increasing func-
tion of the value of the firm’s core resource, V.
The more valuable the core resource, the more
potential rents can be generated from this core
resource (ri/V  0). Thus, the amount of rents
appropriated by the employee is ari.
Also, assume that the employee incurs an op-
portunity cost while making specific human
capital investments. The opportunity cost comes
from the fact that, instead of making specific
human capital investments, the employee can
alternatively make general human capital in-
vestments—for example, developing skills that
improve her marketability. Since general hu-
man capital does not suffer from the problem of
value loss in the case of transfer across busi-
ness settings, the payoff from the employee’s per
unit general human capital investment is de-
noted as w i, which is assumed to be a constant.
3
The total units of human capital investments,
including both specific and general, are denoted
as n (n can also be thought of as the total hours
the employee devotes to making these invest-
ments). Since xi is the total amount of specific
investments, the amount of general investments
is then (n  xi). Thus, the employee’s total pay-
off, denoted as wi, includes the payoffs from
both her specific human capital investments
(xiari) and her general human capital invest-
ments ((n  xi)w i):
wi  axiri  (n  xi)w i (1)
The employee then chooses the optimal
amount of firm-specific investments, xi, that
maximizes her utility. The employee’s concern
over the risk associated with the payoff from her
investments can be captured using a risk-averse
utility function. The particular form of standard
mean variance utility function is thus chosen to
capture the idea that the employee’s utilities
increase with the expected amount of payoff
from her investments, E(wi), but they decrease
with the risk associated with this payoff, var(wi)
(Sargent, 1987). It follows that the employee
solves the following utility function, subject to
her payoff constraint4:
max
xi
U E(wi)
A
2var(wi)
where wi axiri (n xi)w i (2)
A is the absolute risk-averse parameter that
captures the employee’s degree of risk aversion.
Without loss of generality, the parameter, A, is
normalized to 1 (A  1). The wealth constraint
shows that when the employee increases her
level of specific human capital investment
(higher xi), her total wealth will covary more
with the expected rents generated per unit of
specific human capital investment.
From the first-order condition with the normal-
ized risk-aversion parameter (A 1), the optimal
amount of specific human capital investment
chosen by the employee can be obtained as fol-
lows (see the appendix for a more detailed der-
ivation):
x*i 
aE(ri)  w i
var(ari)
(3)
3 In order to focus our attention on the pure effect of
resource risk on employee incentives to make specific hu-
man capital investments, we implicitly assume that general
human capital investments are risk free. But, in reality, gen-
eral human capital investments may not be completely risk-
less. Incorporating the riskiness of general human capital
would make investment in firm-specific human capital even
more attractive relative to general human capital.
4 The mean variance risk-averse utility function is origi-
nally derived from the exponential utility function, which
has the form U(C)  eAC, where A is the Arrow-Pratt index
of absolute risk aversion, given by A  U(C)/U(C). C is the
income (payoff) distributed normally with mean  and stan-
dard deviation 2. It can then be derived that the agent’s
expected utility is
EU(C)   eA   A22
Hence, the objective of the employee is to maximize
U   
A
2
2
which is the same utility function used in this paper.
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This equation has some important implica-
tions. First, the numerator of this equation sug-
gests that the optimal amount of specific human
capital investments an employee chooses to
make (or an employee’s incentive to specialize),
xi*, depends on the amount of rents the em-
ployee is expected to appropriate, aE(ri), relative
to the rents from risk-free general human capital
investments. This is perfectly consistent with
previous research in organizational economics,
which suggests that employee investments in
firm-specific human capital can generate eco-
nomic rents, but the willingness of employees to
make these investments depends on how much
of the rent they expect to be able to appropriate
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001; Grossman &
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Rajan & Zingales,
1998, 2001). Moreover, a small amount of rent
appropriation suggests that an employee ex-
pects significant opportunistic actions on the
part of a firm, while a large amount suggests
that an employee does not expect such actions.
Efforts by employees to contractually protect
themselves from opportunism, and efforts by
firms to reassure employees that they will not
behave opportunistically, can both be inter-
preted as efforts to guarantee that the employ-
ees will realize their expected amount of rent
appropriation, and thereby increase the likeli-
hood that these employees will make specific
human capital investments that generate eco-
nomic rents.
Second, xi* is inversely related to var(ari), the
risk associated with the amount of rent an em-
ployee expects to appropriate per unit of his or
her specific human capital investment. This es-
tablishes a basis for the analysis in this paper:
the incentives for an employee to make specific
human capital investment are negatively af-
fected by the risk to the per unit payoff from his
or her specific human capital investment. As ri,
the rent generated from an employee’s specific
human capital investment, increases with V, the
value of the core resource owned by the firm, so
does the payoff to the employee from his or her
per unit specific investment, ari. It then follows
that the riskiness of this payoff, var(ari), should
also increase with the riskiness of the value of a
firm’s core resources. That is, when the value of
a firm’s core resource falls, so does the value of
employee firm-specific investments and the po-
tential payoff the employee obtains from these
investments. Therefore, the riskier the value of a
firm’s core resources, the lower the employee’s
incentives to make specific human capital in-
vestment.
A lower level of firm-specific human capital
investments, in turn, reduces the total amount of
rents that can be generated from the underlying
core resources and the amount of rents eventu-
ally appropriated by the firm. In this setting, the
firm has a motive to adopt mechanisms to miti-
gate employee concerns over the risk to the
value of the core resource to induce employees
to make these rent-generating investments.
MANAGING THE RISK OF FIRM CORE
RESOURCES AND EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES TO
MAKE FIRM-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS
In order for a firm to induce its employees to
make firm-specific investments, not only must
the firm manage potential opportunism prob-
lems in this exchange, but it must also discover
ways of managing the risks associated with
making human capital investments that are
specific to the firm’s risky core resources. We
consider two possible solutions to this problem
here: (1) compensating employees directly for
accepting these risks and (2) using resource-
based related diversification to mitigate these
risks.
Compensation to Employees for Risk Bearing
The most straightforward solution to the em-
ployee incentive problem stemming from the
riskiness of a firm’s core resources seems to be
for the firm to directly compensate employees
for bearing this risk—that is, pay “key employ-
ees” to make firm-specific investments. Theories
and empirical findings in the strategic manage-
ment literature indeed suggest that diverse
stakeholders, including a firm’s employees, sup-
pliers, and customers, often demand compensa-
tion for risk bearing (Aaker & Jacobson, 1990;
Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; Deephouse & Wiseman,
2000; Miller, 1998; Miller & Chen, 2003). The ex-
pected amount of payment to the employees
should be based on an estimation of the risk to
the value of firm core resources to which these
employees are making specific human capital
investments.
These observations lead to the following prop-
osition:
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Proposition 1: The higher the risk as-
sociated with a firm’s core resources,
the more likely it is the firm’s key em-
ployees will have a larger amount of
total expected compensation.
However, compensating employees for risk
bearing has some limitations in functioning as
an effective employee incentive mechanism.
First, it can be very difficult to write and enforce
a compensation contract (Hart, 1995; Titman,
1984). Bounded rationality linked with environ-
mental uncertainty makes it difficult, if not im-
possible, to identify all the future states of na-
ture that might affect the value of a firm’s core
resources. Even if these states could be antici-
pated, their specific effects on the value of core
resources and employee-specific investments
would remain challenging to quantify. Because
firm core resources are rare and nontradable
and employee-specific human capital invest-
ments are intangible, both are difficult to value.
Moreover, the firm may default on the terms of
the compensation contract in the case of severe
negative economic outcome. For example, a firm
may approach bankruptcy when it no longer has
valuable assets that allow it to continue to op-
erate. In such a case, the terms of the contract
cannot be effectively enforced.
Second, although compensating employees
for risk bearing can, to some extent, create in-
centives for them to make firm-specific human
capital investments, it directly increases firm
expenditures and, thus, imposes costs on the
firm (Miller & Chen, 2003). When the risk associ-
ated with firm core resources is very high, it
becomes increasingly expensive for the firm to
compensate employees for risk bearing, despite
the motivational benefits of such compensation.
As the risk associated with a firm’s core re-
source increases, for a given amount of effort to
make firm-specific investments, the employee
will demand higher compensation, resulting in
higher marginal cost per unit effort and no cor-
responding increase in the expected revenue for
the firm. Therefore, it may not pay for the firm to
motivate employees beyond a certain point
through compensation, because the utility of an
additional unit of effort to make firm-specific
investment is worth less to the firm than the cost
of motivating employees for an incremental unit
of effort. Thus, the optimal compensation sched-
ule often does not fully compensate employees
for risk bearing (Shavell, 1979). This, of course,
will leave employees to reduce efforts and to
underinvest in firm-specific human capital.
Because of the limitations associated with
compensating employees for risk bearing and
because of the costs of such compensation im-
posed on the firm, sometimes the firm may be
better off finding additional ways to reduce the
risk associated with core resources. Resource-
based product market diversification is one
such alternative.5
Resource-Based Corporate Diversification
Generally, the value of a firm’s core resource
is determined in the product markets where that
resource is deployed (Barney, 1991; Bowman &
Amrosini, 2000; Peteraf, 1993). This implies that if
the firm’s core resource can be deployed in mul-
tiple product markets, the value of the resource
in one product market is likely to be different
from that in the other product markets. More-
over, a change in the value of a core resource in
one product market may not necessarily affect
its value in a different product market. This sug-
gests that the risk associated with core re-
sources can be reduced by exploring the appli-
cability of these core resources in other product
markets and diversifying accordingly.
Note that diversifying into multiple product
markets by deploying a firm’s core resource
does not directly reduce the risk to the resource
value in each individual product market. How-
ever, as long as the factors that lead to changes
in one product market are not perfectly corre-
lated with those in another product market, un-
certainty in one product market that has a sig-
nificant effect on the value of the core resource
in that particular market is not likely to have a
similar effect in another market. Therefore,
through diversifying into product markets with
less than perfectly correlated environmental
5 A strategy of resource-based related diversification di-
rectly deals with the risk to core resource value. This makes
such a risk reduction mechanism more appealing in the
context of this paper than some other potential firm-level
risk management mechanisms, such as financial hedging
and unrelated diversification. However, these alternative
mechanisms may be effective in reducing overall firm-level
risk exposure, but the risk to the value of the fundamental
core resources is not likely to be affected significantly. See
Miller (1992, 1998) for a detailed discussion of these alterna-
tive firm-level risk management tools.
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factors, a firm can reduce the overall risk asso-
ciated with the value of the core resource. This
risk reduction, in turn, can potentially increase
employees’ incentives to make human capital
investments that are specific to the firm’s core
resources.6 Generally speaking, the positive ef-
fect of resource-based product market diversifi-
cation on employee incentives is expected to
increase with the level of the risk associated
with the firm’s core resources in the firm’s orig-
inal market(s).
These observations lead to the following prop-
osition.
Proposition 2: The higher the risk as-
sociated with a firm’s core resources,
the more likely it is the firm will diver-
sify into other product markets based
on those core resources.
To the extent that resource-based product
market diversification can substitute for com-
pensating employees for risk bearing as the
means of facilitating employees to make firm-
specific human capital investments, the ability
for a firm to engage in resource-based diversifi-
cation can reduce the need for the firm to pay
employees for risk bearing.
Proposition 3: Ceteris paribus, firms
that have diversified based on their
core resources will subsequently com-
pensate their key employees at a
lower level than if they have not di-
versified in this way.
Note that the arguments above are built on the
implicit assumption that management is able to
implement a resource-based diversification
strategy in such a way that the risks of existing
firm businesses are not altered. However, to the
extent that the existing businesses are dis-
turbed, the effect of resource-based diversifica-
tion on risk reduction and therefore on employee
incentives should be discounted accordingly.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF
DIVERSIFICATION
Note that the pattern of diversification and the
definition of resource relatedness discussed
above are, in spirit, very close to those based on
the concept of the “strategic asset” in the re-
source-based theory of diversification (e.g.,
Markides & Williamson, 1994, 1996; Teece, 1982).
To the extent that a core firm resource is rare
and costly to trade, the diversification pattern
predicted in this paper—that is, diversification
by deploying core firm resources—resembles
the resource-based theory of corporate diversifi-
cation, which argues that multibusiness organi-
zations exist to exploit economies of scope by
sharing rare and costly to imitate strategic as-
sets among businesses (Mahoney & Pandian,
1992; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, 1982).7 However, there
are some important differences in the pattern of
corporate diversification derived from this the-
ory of diversification and traditional resource-
based theories of diversification. These differ-
ences are manifested in the path and the scope
of diversification.
Diversification Path
Traditional resource-based logic suggests
that diversification is appropriate when a firm’s
resources are applicable across the multiple
businesses the firm engages in (Markides &Wil-
liamson, 1994; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988;
Silverman, 1999). The logic developed here indi-
cates that risk reduction, in addition to the abil-
ity to apply firm resources across multiple busi-
nesses, may motivate diversification. This
suggests that a diversifying firm will look to
exploit its current resources and capabilities in
its diversification moves but that it will also
6 Note that in addition to the need for employees to make
human capital investments that are specific to a firm’s core
resource, a diversified firm may also need to induce its
employees to make investments that are specific to a spe-
cific product market the firm operates in. This usually re-
quires different firm policies, such as appropriate compen-
sation mechanisms, which we do not specifically address.
However, this consideration should not directly affect the
arguments made here, as long as the firm requires employ-
ees to make substantial specific investments at the core
resource level.
7 Note that the core resource in this paper is not exactly
the same as a “strategic asset.” While the strategic asset can
be a source of firm rents, the core resource itself does not
generate rents. It can only be a source of rents when it is
combined with specific human capital investments by em-
ployees. Moreover, Markides and Williamson (1994, 1996)
argue that in addition to realizing economies of scope, di-
versification may help improve a firm’s current strategic
assets and build new ones.
2006 471Wang and Barney
look for businesses where it can apply those
resources that have cash flows that are uncorre-
lated with its current business activities.
Proposition 4: Firms that diversify into
businesses that exploit their current
core resources and that have a pattern
of cash flow that is not highly corre-
lated with their current businesses
will generate higher levels of em-
ployee firm-specific investment than
firms that diversify into businesses
that only exploit their current core re-
sources but have a pattern of cash
flow that is highly correlated with
their current businesses.
Diversification Scope
Traditional resource-based logic suggests
that there are often decreasing returns associ-
ated with diversification. This is because, gen-
erally, firms will diversify into a related busi-
ness with the highest potential return first, that
with the second highest potential return second,
and so forth. Barring an exogenous shock that
changes the value of a firm’s core assets, the
last diversification moves made by a firm that
exploit a particular core resource are likely to be
less valuable than the first few diversification
moves exploiting that resource.
The theory of diversification developed here
also suggests that returns from risk reduction
(i.e., the willingness of employees to make firm-
specific investments that have rent-generating
potential) will also have decreasing returns.
This is because portfolio risk is generally a con-
cave function of the number of assets in the
portfolio (Elton & Gruber, 1995), which implies
that, with the increase in the number of busi-
nesses a firm diversifies into, the overall risk to
the value of the core resources falls, but at a
decreasing rate. A decreasing incremental
amount of risk reduction is then likely to lead to
decreasing returns for the firm.
However, while both resource exploitation
and risk reduction may be characterized by de-
creasing returns, these two benefits of diversifi-
cation may not move together over time. Figure
1 shows that as a firm diversifies further away
from its original businesses, both the marginal
FIGURE 1
The Determinants of the Optimal Scope of a Firm
Note: OS1* is the optimal scope when only the benefit from employees’ increased
investment incentives is considered; OS2* is the optimal scope when only the benefit
from economies of scope is considered; OS3* is the optimal scope when both the
benefits of economies of scope and employee incentives are considered.
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advantage obtained from exploiting economies
of scope and that obtained from providing in-
centives for employees to specialize are expected
to decrease, and the marginal cost of diversifica-
tion is expected to increase. When considering
each effect separately, the optimal scope of the
firm is determined by the point where the mar-
ginal revenue of diversification equals marginal
cost (OS1* and OS2* in Figure 1). However, when
both effects are considered, the optimal diversifi-
cation distance is at OS3*, where the marginal
revenue of diversification from the combined ef-
fects equals the marginal cost of diversification.
Of course, the analysis in Figure 1 assumes
that the benefit from realizing economies of
scope, which is determined by the applicability
of a core firm resource (or strategic asset) in
other product markets, and the benefit from pro-
viding employee investment incentives, which
is determined by the degree of reduction in risk
to the core resource value, are not correlated. To
the extent these benefits are correlated, the op-
timal diversification scope would be less than
OS3* (Figure 1). Some strategy scholars have
suggested that businesses that exploit the same
underlying core resources can nevertheless
have very different patterns of cash flow over
time (e.g., Markides & Williamson, 1994, 1996;
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), implying a low corre-
lation between these two benefits from diversi-
fication. However, the extent to which these ben-
efits are correlated is ultimately an empirical
question. All this suggests the following.
Proposition 5: When the benefits of re-
alizing economies of scope and in-
creased employee incentives to spe-
cialize are not perfectly correlated, a
firm will diversify more widely than
when only one of the benefits is con-
sidered, and the optimal diversifica-
tion scope increases with a decrease
in the correlation between the two
benefits.
Finally, it is worth noting that this paper’s
emphasis on risk reduction from diversification
is also related to the argument of agency theory,
in which diversification is used to reduce over-
all firm risk exposure. The agency argument,
however, considers diversification as an out-
come of conflicts between shareholders and
managers, since it reduces managers’ employ-
ment risk, but at the expense of the shareholders
of the firm (Amihud & Lev, 1981). In contrast, we
argue here that shareholders as well as employ-
ees (including managers) potentially gain from
the firm’s diversification, because diversifica-
tion encourages employees to join the firm and
to invest in firm-specific knowledge and skills.
Another notable difference between these two
perspectives is that central to our argument is
“resource-based” diversification (related), which
reduces risks associated with the core re-
sources. In contrast, agency theory emphasizes
conglomerate diversification (unrelated), which
leads to financial risk reduction—that is, it
smooths cash flow at the corporate level but
does not effectively reduce the risk of the under-
lying core resources.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the risk associated with
the value of a firm’s core resources has an im-
pact on employee decisions to make firm-
specific investments that are often crucial for
rent creation. We have further demonstrated
that resource-based product market diversifica-
tion reduces the risk associated with the value
of core firm resources and, therefore, provides
positive incentives for employees to make these
specific investments. Incorporating this per-
spective into research on diversification motives
holds the potential for a more comprehensive
understanding of this important phenomenon in
modern corporations (e.g., Montgomery, 1994).
The paper also provides important implica-
tions for a firm’s senior managers. It suggests
that managers implementing a resource-based
diversification strategy should take into consid-
eration the effect of diversification on employee
incentives. Such a consideration not only can
lead to a different diversification path but may
also lead to a different optimal diversification
scope.
The arguments that are advanced here, how-
ever, are only a first step toward a more thor-
ough understanding of the roles of risk and em-
ployee incentives in resource-based theories. In
future research scholars need to address some
limitations of the current paper and further our
understanding in these areas.
The first area that requires further research
attention is associated with formal modeling.
Here we have assumed a linear rent-sharing
scheme between the employee and the firm.
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Since firm rents are assumed to be normally
distributed, so is the amount of payoff to the
employee’s specific investments, suggesting a
symmetrical upside and downside risk associ-
ated with the employee’s payoff. However,
sometimes a nonlinear payoff function, such as
an optionlike function with a component of pay-
ment that is fixed, seems to be a more plausible
assumption. These issues concerning the inter-
action between the payment and rent-sharing
function and the shape of the distribution of
uncertain outcomes may be an interesting fu-
ture research direction.8
Second, we have focused on the discussion of
the role of core resources and resource-based
diversification as an important mechanism for
reducing the risks associated with these core
resources. Nevertheless, we have omitted some
other relevant strategic questions that deserve
future research attention. For example, when
implementing a resource-based diversification
strategy, what noncore resources should the
firm internalize with the core resources? How
should firm strategies be different in utilizing
these different types of resources? How do com-
plementary noncore resources affect the risk as-
sociated with core resources? While it is beyond
the scope of this paper to include the discussion
of these issues, future research along this path
will help complete a theory of core resources
and employee incentives.
The third area that requires further research
efforts is related to the limitation of the applica-
bility of the current framework. The ideas here
are most applicable to firms that face moderate
levels of uncertainty, but not to those that oper-
ate in either very stable or extremely volatile
environments. In a stable environment the value
of a firm’s core resource is also likely to be
stable, and rents generated from the resource
and employee-specific human capital can be
sustained over a long period of time. In this
setting employees have stronger incentives to
specialize and to appropriate their share of the
rents. In an extremely volatile environment, how-
ever, rents may become so short-lived that induc-
ing employees to make specific investments can
be too costly. Furthermore, when changes in envi-
ronmental factors render the core firm resource
itself obsolete, diversification by deploying the
core resource will no longer be effective in pre-
serving the value of the resource. In this case, a
better strategy for the firm is to develop capabili-
ties that enable the firm to efficiently adapt to
constantly changing and fast-evolving environ-
ments. Although the recent dynamic capabilities
literature (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) helps ad-
dress this issue, it is clearly an area that deserves
further research attention.
APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (3)
Plugging the employee payoff constraint
wi  axiri(V)  (n  xi)w i
into the utility function
U  E(wi) 
A
2 var(wi)
we then have
U  E(wi) 
A
2 var(wi) axiE(ri) (n xi)w i

A
2 xi
2var(ari)	
which is to be maximized with respect to xi.With
normalized risk-aversion parameter (A  1), the
first-order condition (with normalized A) for xi is
Uxi  aE(ri)  w i  xivar(ari) 0
The xi*, the amount of specific human capital
investments that maximize the employee’s util-
ity, can be obtained by solving the above equa-
tion for xi:
x*i 
aE(ri)  w i
var(ari)
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